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Abstract 
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by the production of sector-specific knowledge. In the model, we find that long run 
differences in total factor productivity growth across sectors are independent of the 
parameters of the knowledge production function except for one, which we term the fertility 
of knowledge. Differences in R&D intensity are also independent of most other parameters. 
The fertility of knowledge in the capital sector is central to the growth properties of the model 
economy. 
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1 Introduction
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates vary widely and persistently across
industries.1 However, economic growth rates for aggregate variables are known to be
fairly constant in the long run. What industry-level parameters might lie behind the
observed diﬀerences in TFP growth rates? How can one reconcile the observation of
a stable aggregate growth path with diverging productivity at the industry level?
This paper answers these questions using a general equilibrium model of endoge-
nous productivity change. In the model, TFP growth is the outcome of research
activity, which produces economically useful knowledge. Industries diﬀer in terms of
a number of factors that aﬀect the returns to R&D activity, including the determi-
nants of the demand for their goods, and the parameters of the production function
for new knowledge. We investigate which of these factors lead to cross-industry dif-
ferences in TFP growth rates and R&D intensity, and study under what conditions
the economy possesses an aggregate balanced growth path (BGP).
Our framework is a multi-sector growth model and contains a number of factors
that have been thought to aﬀect the returns to R&D.2 In addition, we consider one
new potential source of cross-industry variation: the extent to which old knowledge is
useful for the production of new knowledge. We call this the fertility of knowledge.
In a class of one-sector growth models, Jones (1995) shows that the value of this
parameter must be less than unity if the aggregate economy is to possess a balanced
growth path that is consistent with the data. Otherwise, the economy displays "scale
eﬀects": larger countries grow faster, and countries with growing populations would
display accelerating growth.3
Allowing for R&D in a multi-sector framework, we find that a BGP requires
restrictions only on the fertility parameter of the industries that produce capital
goods. Allowing capital to be an input in the production of knowledge, this restriction
is that "average" fertility in these sectors must be bounded from above by a number
strictly less than one. The upper bound is a function of the capital share of costs.
Strikingly, we find that the equilibrium ranking of TFP growth rates across sectors
depends only on cross-industry diﬀerences in the fertility of knowledge. While the
result is stark, the role of the fertility parameter in a one-sector context provides some
1For example, among capital goods, Jorgenson et al (2005) estimate that annual TFP growth
rates in the United States over the period 1960-2004 range from -1.0% per year in Structures to
10.4% in Computers and Oﬃce Equipment.
2A small sample of the related literature includes Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
Jones (1995) on R&D-based models of economic growth, and Pakes and Schankerman (1984), Jaﬀe
(1986) and Cohen and Levin (1989) on R&D intensity.
3In the terminology of Jones (2005a), these are "strong" scale eﬀects.
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intuition. In a one-sector model, eliminating aggregate scale eﬀects by introducing
decreasing returns to knowledge also eliminates the eﬀects of other parameters and
policy variables on equilibrium rates of economic growth. In a multi-sector context,
a similar result applies to the parameters that determine the returns to R&D. These
parameters may aﬀect sectoral diﬀerences in R&D intensity, and even the size of each
sector, but only the fertility of knowledge aﬀects the rate at which inputs accumulate
relative to each other — including knowledge.4 The key to this result, however, is not
that fertility is limited in each sector, but that TFP growth in each sector must be
stable over time.
Our results address some fundamental issues regarding the nature of aggregate
growth and in particular growth accounting exercises. A notable feature of post-
war US data is a secular decline in relative price of capital, and this phenomenon is
widely attributed investment-specific technical change: productivity improvements
that aﬀect primarily the capital goods sector. Greenwood et al (1997) and Cummins
and Violante (2002) ascribe approximately 60% of economic growth to investment-
specific technical change and suggest that this is a significant channel for postwar
US economic growth. Investment-specific technical change in our model can arise
endogenously when the fertility of knowledge is higher in the durable goods sector.
In a calibrated version of the model, we find that the model economy is broadly
consistent with the distribution of income and employment across activities, and with
the ranking of TFP growth rates across types of capital. The fertility of knowledge
varies widely across sectors, but we find fertility values to be typically quite low,
except in the fastest-growing sectors.
In related work, Klenow (1996) studies the determinants of cross-sectoral TFP
growth diﬀerences in a version of Romer’s (1990) model, in which R&D results in
a growing number of intermediates. However, that model has scale eﬀects at the
industry level, and this is what largely drives the theoretical results. Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2006) develop a two-sector endogenous growth model in which growth is
driven by the production of knowledge. Their model does not identify the techno-
logical determinants of R&D intensity across industries but focuses instead on the
role of diﬀerent capital shares across industries. In Krusell (1998), R&D leads to
investment-specific technical change, as it can do here. However, R&D only oc-
curs in the capital goods sector, so it is unsuitable for cross-industry comparisons.
Vourvachaki (2006) also develops an endogenous growth model with two final good
sectors, but again R&D only occurs in one sector.
Section 2 describes the structure of the model, and Section 3 studies analytically
4This is consistent with the observation that R&D intensity varies much more in cross sections
than do TFP growth rates. See Klenow (1996) and Burnside (1996).
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its long run behavior. Section 4 explores the quantitative implications of our results.
Section 5 provides with more discussion on the knowledge production function. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
The economy consists of z sectors, where firms in sectors i ∈ {1, ..m− 1} produce
consumption goods, whereas firms in sectors j ∈ {m, ...z} produce investment goods.
Each good comes in a continuum of diﬀerentiated varieties, and is produced using
capital and labor as physical inputs. The productivity of a firm in any given sector
depends upon the quantity of technical knowledge or "ideas" at its disposal. New
knowledge is produced as a result of individual firm activity, and spillovers from
other firms.
2.1 Households
Time is discrete and indexed by t. There is a continuum of households of measure
Nt = gtN . Households have preferences over a finite number of diﬀerent goods i ∈
{1, ..m− 1}, each of which comes in a continuum of varieties h ∈ [0, 1]. The life-time
utility of a household is
∞X
t=0
(βgN)
t c1−θt − 1
1− θ (1)
ct =
m−1Q
i=1
µ
cit
ωi
¶ωi
, cit =
µZ 1
0
c
μi−1
μi
iht dh
¶ μi
μi−1
i = 1, ..m− 1 (2)
where β is the discount factor, βgN < 1, θ > 0, μi > 1, ωi > 0 and
P
i ωi = 1.
The parameter μi is the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent varieties of good
i, and 1/θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The life-time utility is a
logarithmic function of ct when θ = 1.We use lower case letters to denote per-capita
variables. In most of what follows, i indexes a consumption sector or good, j indexes
a type of capital, and h indexes a firm in any given sector.
Each household member is endowed with one unit of labor and kt units of capital.
They earn income by renting capital and labor to firms, and by earning profits from
the firms. Their budget constraint is
m−1X
i=1
Z
pihtcihtdh+
zX
j=m
Z
pjhtxjhtdh ≤ wt +Rtkt + πt (3)
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where xjht is investment in variety h of capital good j, piht is the price of variety h
of good i, wt and Rt are rental prices of labor and capital, and Ntπt ≡
zP
i=1
R 1
0
Πihtdh
equals total profits from firms.
The capital accumulation equation is gNkt+1 = xt + (1− δk) kt The composite
investment good xt is produced via a Cobb-Douglas function of all capital types j, so
the elasticity of substitution across capital goods j is equal to one, while the elasticity
of substitution across diﬀerent varieties of capital good j is equal to μj > 1 :
xt =
Qz
j=m
µ
xjt
κj
¶κj
, xjt =
∙Z
x(
μj−1)/μj
jht dh
¸μj/(μj−1)
j = m, ..z (4)
where κj > 0 and
P
j κj = 1. We define the price index for the consumption
composite ct and the investment composite respectively as:
pct ≡
Pm−1
i=1
R 1
0
pihtcihtdh
ct
; pxt ≡
Pz
j=m
R 1
0
pjhtxjhtdh
xt
. (5)
2.2 Firms
The production function for variety h of good i is
Yiht = TihtKαihtN
1−α
iht (6)
where α ∈ (0, 1), Tiht is knowledge, Yiht is output, Kiht is capital and Niht is labor.
Let Fiht be knowledge produced by firm h in sector i ≤ h. Knowledge accumulates
over time according to the function
Tih,t+1 = Fiht + (1− δT )Tiht (7)
where new knowledge is produced according to the function
Fiht = Ai
¡
T 1−σiiht T
σi
it
¢φi QαihtL1−αiht (8)
where Qiht and Liht are capital and labor used in production of knowledge, and
Tit =
R 1
0
Tihtdh. The knowledge production function has constant returns to rival-
rous inputs (capital and labor). In this case, following the empirical literature, the
equilibrium stock of knowledge equals the depreciated stock of R&D spending. We
study the implications of diminishing returns (or duplication in research) in Section
(5).5
5The capital share is the same as in the final goods production function. This allows us to
derive closed-form solutions: more importantly, it implies that the production function diﬀers
across sectors only in terms of the TFP index Tih, which is the focus of the paper.
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The literature has focused on several factors that may determine cross-industry
R&D intensity diﬀerences. A survey by Cohen and Levin (1989) identifies them
broadly as: market size, technological opportunity, and spillovers. In our model,
industries may diﬀer in terms of five parameters: μi, ωi, Ai, σi and φi. The first two,
μi and ωi, are preference parameters, that determine the scope and sensitivity of po-
tential returns to R&D. The remaining parameters are technological, and determine
the structure of the knowledge production function. Pakes and Schankerman (1984)
identify technological opportunity as a constant in the ideas’ production function,
similar to our parameter Ai. Our formulation of knowledge spillovers σi is as in
Krusell (1998).
In the model, knowledge is a persistent stock which may be increased by research.
The amount of new knowledge generated by research is a function of the quantity
of inputs used, and the quantity of pre-existing knowledge. Parameter σi ∈ [0, 1)
indicates the extent to which firms in sector i benefit from the knowledge of their
competitors.6 We denote γiht ≡ Tiht+1/Tiht as the growth factor of Tih. Parameter
φi ∈ R captures the extent to which pre-existing knowledge is useful for the produc-
tion of new knowledge. We will be say that if φi > φi0 then sector i is more fertile
than sector i0.
In a one-sector context, our notion of "fertility" is referred to as the "intertem-
poral knowledge spillover," or the "measure of decreasing returns to ideas." Its eﬀect
on the knowledge stock when positive is referred to as "standing on shoulders," and
when negative as "fishing out." In the former case, knowledge becomes easier to
produce as it accumulates, whereas in the latter case it becomes more diﬃcult. One
of our innovations is to present fertility as a potential source of cross-industry vari-
ation and, as a result, we feel it is appropriate to introduce new and more concise
terminology.
Each sector i ≤ z is monopolistically competitive. Taking its demand function as
given, a firm h in sector i chooses optimally its level of production and R&D inputs
in order to maximize the discounted stream of real profits,
∞P
t=0
λt
Πiht
pct
(9)
where λt is the discount factor at time t, with λ0 = 1, and λt =
tQ
s=1
1
1+rt
for t ≥ 1,
6In the model there are no cross-sectoral spillovers. We study such spillovers in Section (5) .
Empirical research finds mostly weak spillovers across firms within narrow, related sectors, but does
not find measurable spillovers across broad sectors — see Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) and (1989)
and Schultz (2006).
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where rt is the real interest rate. The firm’s profits are given by
Πiht = pihtYiht − wt (Niht + Liht)−Rt (Kiht +Qiht) (10)
3 Decentralized Equilibrium
Definition 1 A decentralized equilibrium consists of sequences of prices and of al-
locations such that:
1. Given the sequence of prices
nn
(piht)h∈[0,1]
oz
i=1
, Rt, wt
o
t=0,1..
, households choosenn
(ciht, xiht)h∈[0,1]
oz
i=1
o
t=0,1,...
to maximize their discounted stream of utility
(1);
2. Given the sequence of input prices {Rt, wt}t=0,1.. , and taking their demand func-
tions as given, firms choose
nn
(Kiht, Niht, Qiht, Liht)h∈[0,1]
oz
i=1
o
t=0,1...
to maxi-
mize discounted stream of profit (9);
3. The sequence of input prices {Rt, wt}t=0,.. satisfies the capital and labor market
clearing conditions in all periods:
zP
i=1
Z 1
0
(Kiht +Qiht) = Kt,
zP
i=1
Z 1
0
(Niht + Liht) = Nt (11)
Our objective is to understand dynamics across broad sectors of the economy
and not across diﬀerent varieties of any given good. Therefore, we focus on sym-
metric equilibria across varieties within each sector i and suppress the firm index h
henceforth.
The equilibrium results are summarized in the following claims. All proofs are
given in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium,
Kit
Nit
=
Qjt
Ljt
∀i, j, and pit
pjt
=
Tjt
¡
1− 1/μj
¢
Tit (1− 1/μi)
. (12)
The intuition is that competitive input markets require marginal rates of technical
substitution across labor and capital to be equalized across firms. The assumption
of the Cobb-Douglas production function with equal capital shares across activities
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then delivers the results. Under (12), the capital market-clearing condition then
implies that the aggregate capital-labor ratio k is also the capital-labor ratio for
both production and R&D activities. This facilitates the proof of the following
aggregation result.
Lemma 2 Let 1/μx =
Pz
i=m κi (1/μi). The investment sectors j ∈ {m, ..., z} can be
aggregated into one sector with a production function
Ntxt ≡ Txt
³Pz
j=mKjt
´α ³Pz
j=mNjt
´1−α
(13)
where the knowledge index Txt equals
Txt =
"
zQ
j=m
µ
1− 1/μj
1− 1/μx
¶#
zQ
j=m
T κjjt (14)
The result derives the production function for the investment composite xt from
the optimal input allocations for sectors j ∈ {m, ..., z} . It also shows that the markup
for the composite investment good is a weighted average of the markups in each
investment sector. We denote γxt = Tx,t+1/Txt :
γxt =
zQ
j=m
γκjjt . (15)
Lemma 2 is an aggregation result which allows us to relate the rental price of capital
to the TFP index of composite investment goods, which simplifies the Euler condition
for the consumer in the following Lemma. Let qt be the relative price of capital and
Gt the gross return on investment in terms of capital goods. Then,
qt =
pxt
pct
Gt ≡ 1− δk +
Rt
pxt
. (16)
Lemma 3 The Euler condition for the consumer satisfies
1
β
µ
ct+1
ct
¶θ
=
qt+1
qt
Gt+1 (17)
where the equilibrium physical gross return of investment is:
Gt = 1− δk + αTxtkα−1t
µ
1− 1
μx
¶
. (18)
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The key of the proof is to derive Rt/pxt as function of Txt and pxt/pjt follows
(12). We next turn to the dynamic decisions for the firm. Define ni ≡ Ni/N and
li ≡ Li/N as the employment shares for production and R&D activities in sector i.
Lemma 4 The firm’s dynamic optimization implies
Gt+1
γφiit
γxt
= Aikαt+1Nit+1T
φi−1
it+1 + φi (1− σi)
¡
γit+1 − 1 + δT
¢
+ 1− δT , ∀i (19)
Equation (19) is derived from the optimal Tiht+1 chosen by the firm. If χiht is the
shadow price for knowledge Tiht+1, then
χiht =
∙
λt+1piht+1
pct+1
∂Yiht+1
∂Tiht+1
¸
future production
+
∙
χiht+1
∂Fiht+1
∂Tiht+1
¸
future research
+
£
χiht+1 (1− δT )
¤
future knowledge
(20)
The equation reflect three benefits of the production of more knowledge: (1) more
eﬃcient production of goods and services at time t+ 1, (2) more eﬃcient production
of knowledge at time t+ 1, and (3) more future knowledge. The equilibrium χiht is
determined by equating the marginal benefit and marginal cost of research eﬀorts
(Qiht and Liht), e.g. for Liht
χiht
∂Fiht
∂Liht
=
λt
pct
∂Πiht+1
∂Liht
(21)
The key to equation (19) is that some of these terms depend on the rate at
which technology improves — due to changes in the relative prices of final goods and
changes in shadow price of knowledge, whereas others depend on its level — due to the
current cost of resources. Rational researchers must thus make a trade-oﬀ between
both dynamic and static concerns. If the economy displays a balanced growth path,
the dynamic elements of this decision problem must be constant. For the terms that
are expressed in levels to also be constant, however, requires the growth rates of their
component variables to oﬀset each other. In the case of equation (19), this suggests
that, the long run growth rate of TFP might be related to the (endogenous) growth
rate of the capital stock, to the growth rate of the population, and to coeﬃcients
that aﬀect the balance between these growth rates — in this case α and fertility φi.
3.1 Aggregate Balanced growth path
We look for a balanced growth path (BGP) where aggregate variables are growing at
the same constant rate but sectoral TFP growth rates are diﬀerent.7 More precisely,
7Note that if γi are the same across sectors, then Lemma 1 implies that relative prices are
constant, then the model essentially reduces to a one-sector growth model.
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such a BGP requires a constant consumption-capital ratio which in our model is
the expression c/ (qk). As in a one-sector model, certain conditions are required for
solutions to be interior solutions, and for transversality conditions to be satisfied. We
distinguish between these two sets of conditions for balanced growth in a multi-sector
model by stating them in separate Propositions.
Define φx and φc such that
1
1− φx
=
zP
j=m
κj
1− φj
;
1
1− φc
=
m−1P
i=1
ωi
1− φi
(22)
and define Φ and Υ as:
Φ ≡
µ
1− φx −
α
1− α
¶−1
; Υ =
1− φx
1− φc
+
α
1− α (23)
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists an equilibrium with li, ni > 0 that satisfy the
transversality conditions for Ti and k. If
Φ,Υ > 0 (24)
then there exists a unique aggregate balanced growth path. Along this path c/q and k
grow by a constant factor (γ∗x)
1/(1−α), and c grows by a constant factor (γ∗x)
Υ , where
γ∗x = g
Φ
N . (25)
Finally, knowledge Ti grows by a factor γ∗i where
(γ∗i )
1−φi = (γ∗x)
1−φx ∀i. (26)
Proposition 2 Along the balanced growth path, li, ni > 0, and the transversality
conditions for Ti and k are satisfied if
β < (1/gN)
1+(1−θ)ΦΥ , and (27)
∀i, φi (1− σi) < 1, g
Φ/(1−φi)
N ≥ (1− δT )
1/(1−φx)
Corollary 1 A BGP exists with R&D in all sectors provided conditions (24) and
(27) are satisfied.
The key of the proof is to observe from (18) that k grows by a factor γ1/(1−α)x ,
which by (15) is constant if γi is constant in all the capital sectors. We then use the
optimal R&D condition (19) to derive the condition for constant values of γj. The
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upped bound on β is required for the transversality conditions. Then (19) implies
φi (1− σi) < 1 is suﬃcient for positive ni. Finally, the knowledge accumulation
equation (7) implies that li is positive if future knowledge exceeds the stock of existing
knowledge after depreciation, i.e. γi ≥ 1 − δT , then (26) implies that g
1/(1−φi)
N ≥
(1− δT )1/(1−φx) is required for positive li. It is worth noting that positive li, and in
general the existence of an aggregate balanced growth path, does not imply positive
TFP growth when δT > 0.
A comparison of our main result with Jones (1995) is useful. Jones (1995) presents
a one-sector model, in which the growth equation (25) holds but with Φ = λ/(1 −
φ),where λ is a positive constant and φ is the one-sector model fertility parameter. So
his condition for existence of a BGP is φ < 1. In our model balanced growth restricts
only the weighted average of fertility parameters across capital goods: φx < 1 is
necessary for Φ > 0 (although not suﬃcient). No such restrictions are required
on the fertility parameters in consumption goods sectors, or on the average for the
whole economy, since φc < 1 is not necessary for Υ > 0. Also, fertility need not be
equal across individual sectors or bounded by unity in each and every sector. These
results can reconcile the theoretical predictions with estimates of aggregate fertility
parameters, such as those by Porter and Stern (2005) and Abdih and Joutz (2006),
who find aggregate parameters larger than unity.
Another diﬀerence between our results and Jones’s is due to the inclusion of
capital in our production function for knowledge. If α > 0 the fertility parameter φx
is bounded below unity by a number that depends on the capital share. The key is
that new ideas increase the productivity of the sector that produces capital — which
is itself an input into the production of ideas — so decreasing returns to ideas alone
is not suﬃcient for the economy to have a BGP.
Thus, we find in general that the restrictions on the fertility parameters imposed
by balanced growth depend on whether there are several sectors independently con-
ducting research, on whether there is any exogenous depreciation of knowledge, on
whether there are knowledge spillovers, and on whether capital is used in the pro-
duction of knowledge. When all these are absent our restrictions converge to Jones’s
restriction.
3.2 Properties along the Balanced growth path
We now discuss other properties along the BGP. We first show that it satisfies the
Kaldor (1961) stylized facts. We then discuss the implications of the model for
sectoral TFP growth and for sectoral R&D intensity under balanced growth.
11
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Figure 1: US Real GDP per person (constant 2000 dollars, log scale), investment-
ouput ratio, and the quality-adjusted relative price of capital in the United States,
1953-2000. Sources: United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Cummins and
Violante (2002). Real GDP per head is plotted against an exponential time trend.
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Define y as total output per capita in consumption units:
y ≡
zP
i=1
piTikαni
pc
(28)
Proposition 3 Along the BGP, the consumption-output ratio, R&D expenditure
shares and the real interest rate are constants.
Proposition 4 Along the BGP, sectoral TFP growth rates satisfy
γ1−φii = γ
1−φj
j ∀i (29)
Thus, for any two sectors i, j with γi, γj ≥ 1, we have γi ≥ γj if and only if φi ≥ φj.
Condition (29) follows immediately from (26). It implies that along the aggregate
balanced growth path TFP growth rates can be diﬀerent across sectors but they must
be "balanced" according to their fertility. Moreover, for any two sectors with positive
TFP growth, the more fertile sector grows faster. Note that (26) implies that sector
i has positive TFP growth along the aggregate balanced growth path only when its
fertility is less than unity.
Corollary 2 Along the BGP, the relative price of capital grows by a constant factor:
gq =
qt+1
qt
= (γ∗x)
(1−φx)/(1−φc)−1 . (30)
Corollary (2) follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 4. In the model, the rela-
tive price of capital is falling as in Figure 1 when TFP growth in the "aggregate"
consumption sector is slower than TFP growth in the "aggregate" capital sector. If
productivity growth is positive in both, then the relative price of capital is falling if
and only if φx > φc: it must be easier to build on previous knowledge in the durable
goods sector than in non-durables.
Along the balanced growth path, the R&D expenditure share is the same as
R&D employment share within any sector i. Thus, we refer to li/ (li + ni) as "R&D
intensity" in any sector i.
Proposition 5 Along the balanced growth path,
ni
li
=
Gγφii /γx − (1− δT )
γi − (1− δT )
− φi (1− σi) ∀i. (31)
Thus, for any two sectors i, j with γi, γj ≥ 1, if φi ≥ φj and φi (1− σi) ≥ φj (1− σj)
then li/ (li + ni) ≥ lj/ (lj + nj) .
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Proposition 4 implies that the ranking of sectoral growth rates depends on only
one parameter — fertility — and Proposition 5 implies that the ranking of sectoral
R&D intensities depends on only two parameters — fertility and spillovers. Spillovers
matter because, to the individual firm, the private fertility of knowledge (i.e. the
intertemporal spillover they perceive) is (1− σi)φi, which decreases with σi.8 Con-
sequently, TFP growth rates and R&D intensity need not be correlated in the model.
On the other hand, if the values of σi do not vary much across industries, then R&D
intensity and TFP growth may be correlated in the model — because both are related
to the underlying parameter φi, not because R&D intensity causes TFP growth.
Some empirical studies do find thatother factors may be related to R&D intensity,
although results can vary from paper to paper. Considering the relationship between
their findings and ours suggests further directions for exploration.
First, Cohen and Levin (1989) provide an extensive survey of the literature on
the determinants of R&D intensity. A point that stands out from their survey and
from the literature overall is the diﬃculty of identifying both adequate measures
of knowledge and adequate indicators of its correlates. For example, patent counts
(sometimes weighted by citations) are a commonplace measure of knowledge output.
The survey of Griliches (1990) contains a number of caveats regarding the use of
patent data for such purposes, particularly that a central determinant of the be-
havior of patent and citation-weighted patent series may lie in the institutions that
regulate the patenting process itself. Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) find a decline in the
fertility of research in a one-sector model, but also note that this finding is related to
an increasing propensity to cite. Samaniego (in press) provides an example of how
the use of patent data may bias results if there is a systematic shift in the propensity
to patent (or cite), as this would cause a divergence between the true stock of knowl-
edge and its proxy. More generally, an incorrect empirical model of knowledge will
lead to biased estimates of its relationship to and influence upon economic factors
(including its own production function). Our approach contrasts with that of the
related literature because it does not require a measure of the knowledge stock, but
rather identifies the properties of the production function for knowledge on the basis
of its long run growth implications, within the model framework.
Second, the related empirical work mostly lacks a notion of φi.9 If φi is hard
to identify separately from other candidate determinants of R&D or if it is corre-
lated with them, then its omission may introduce biased estimates. For example,
8Proposition 5 implies a negative relationship between intra-industry spillovers and R&D inten-
sity controlling for other variables (the φ0is). This is consistent with the findings of Bernstein and
Nadiri (1989).
9Exceptions include Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Kortum (1997).
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Pakes and Schankerman (1984) are unable to separately identify opportunity and
appropriability in their model, but ascribe a large role in R&D intensity diﬀerences
to their combination, as reflected in an industry fixed eﬀect. However, if the em-
pirical counterpart of φi is not independently identified, it may also enter the fixed
eﬀect. Alternatively, it could be that the determinants of φi are the same determi-
nants of the other parameters — for example, if φi is related to the size or density
of the network of researchers in a given field, it could be correlated with measures
of market size, without there being any direct link between market size and R&D
intensity through demand side channels. It would be interesting to estimate R&D
intensity with a more complete set of industry variables, including a measure of φi.
As noted, Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) do estimate an aggregate equivalent of φi in
a structural framework, but they do not report cross-industry estimates nor explore
the implications of their findings for R&D intensity.
4 Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to the quantitative implications of our model for TFP growth rates and
R&D intensities. First, we would like to see whether a BGP exists for parametriza-
tions that are consistent with the data. Second, given the link between TFP growth
rates and fertility in the model, we would like to see what values of φi the model
suggests are consistent with the data. Finally, the model implies that diﬀerences in
R&D intensity depend only on fertility φi and spillovers σi, and it is of interest to
see which of the two might be the quantitatively dominant factor.
Along the balanced growth path, TFP growth rates in the model depend on
parameters α, gN and φi, while R&D intensities depend, in addition, on δT and σi.
We calibrate these parameters to post-war US data.10. First, we consider a special
case where the economy has only one capital sector, denoted x, and one consumption
sector, denoted c. Thus, z = m = 2. As discussed in the introduction, a large
literature studies investment-specific technical change, so the behavior of the model
economy in this case may shed light on the phenomenon. Second, we consider a
version in which there are many capital goods sectors, so that z > m = 2.
10Wherever possible, we use data for the period 1947-2000, as this is the time period over which
Cummins and Violante (2002) report the data that we will use to impute cross-sectoral diﬀerences
in TFP growth as described below.
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4.1 On TFP growth rates
For the 2-sector economy, Lemma 1 relates the changes in relative prices to changes in
TFP growth rates, Proposition 1 links TFP growth in the capital sector to aggregate
growth, and Proposition 4 links TFP growth in the capital sector to the consumption
sector.
To begin, we set α = 0.35. Values between 0.3 and 0.4 are common, so we adopt
an intermediate value. The US NIPA indicate that gy = 1.022 in consumption units,
and the US Census Bureau that gN = 1.012. In the model, gy also represents the
growth of real consumption, so gy = γ
1/(1−α)
x gq where gq = γc/γx is growth in the
relative price of capital. The value of gq will be important for our quantitative results.
As a benchmark, we use the quality-adjusted relative prices reported by Cummins
and Violante (2002), and explore other values below. They find that gq = 1.026−1,
so that γx = 1.0313 and γc = 1.0052. These values are all that are required to derive
implicit fertility values in the model economy.
Equations (25) and (26) imply that φx = 0.075, and φc = −4.53. Thus, knowledge
in the capital goods sector weakly enhances the ability to produce new knowledge,
whereas in the consumption goods sector the production of new knowledge becomes
more diﬃcult to produce as it accumulates.
To assess the sensitivity of the results to our choice of relative prices, we performed
two experiments. First, we repeated the procedure, this time using the oﬃcial relative
price of capital as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This price decreases
by 0.8% on average over the period in question, which implies a smaller divergence
of TFP across sectors. The calibrated value of γx is correspondingly lower, as is the
value of φx. Second, we examined a range of values of gq both larger and smaller
than those suggested by the data, to see how robust the basic growth parameters
of the model are to these values. Relative prices ranged between 1 — so that the
relative price of capital is constant — and 1.04, above which the implied φc is too
high for nc/lc in (31) to be positive.11 Results are reported in Table (1). When
the oﬃcial price deflators are used instead of quality-adjusted prices, the value of
φx drops and becomes negative, although it remains close to zero. φc is larger than
before, since productivity growth in that sector is not as low. On the other hand,
when the relative price of capital decreases by about 4% annually, TFP growth in
non-durables almost shuts down, so φc become more negative. φx is positive, but
11It is worth underlining that, for parameters satisfying Proposition 1, the economy always has a
BGP. However, this does not imply that, for any given values of (α, gn, gy), there exist parameters
that can match any value of gq. Indeed, a positive finding of our model is that, for the empirically
relevant range of gq, a parametrization always exists that is consistent with a BGP.
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bounded below 17%.
γx/γc γx γc φx φc Source
1.000 1.014 1.014 −0.38 −0.38 Lower bound
1.008 1.02 1.011 −0.16 −0.97 BEA
1.018 1.026 1.008 0.000 −2.26 Intermediate value
1.026 1.031 1.005 0.075 −4.53 CV (2002)
1.040 1.040 1.001 0.164 −78.7 Upper bound
Table (1) — Model economy under diﬀerent assumptions
on the relative price of capital. Values of γx/γc correspond
to the range over which the equilibrium is consistent with a
decreasing relative price of capital.
We conclude that, in the baseline model, the values of φx that are consistent
with the data are small or close to zero, and that the corresponding values of φc are
negative. Although we are not aware of any fertility estimates that distinguish among
sectors, these small values are consistent with the findings of several authors. For
example, using U.S. aggregate data for the period 1950-1993, Jones (2002) obtains a
negative value for "aggregate fertility,"12. Using data on individual researchers and
their patents, Jones (2005b) also argues that a persistent base of knowledge may in
fact be a burden if current innovators must first acquire the same or greater expertise
than past innovators. Kortum (1997) argues that a negative value of aggregate
fertility is consistent with a number of medium-term features of the data, such as the
relationship between productivity and R&D input over the productivity slowdown.
Some estimates of φ are larger: see Porter and Stern (2000) or Abdih and Joutz
(2006). However, they are based on aggregate patent counts, which could yield
biased results if the link between patents and knowledge changes over time — see
Grilliches (1990), Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) and Samaniego (in press) for
some of these concerns. Moreover, they do not distinguish between sectors, which
vary in their propensity to patent new ideas. If the propensity to patent is higher
in industries with high values of φi, estimates of fertility will be biased due to a
compositional eﬀect. This is likely if knowledge in many sectors is managerial or
commercial in nature, as discussed below.
To further illustrate the implications of the model, we consider the case where
there are several types of capital: z > m = 2. The data indicate a range of TFP
12Table A1 of Jones (2002) implies φ = −15.7 when the knowledge production function has
constant returns to rivalrous inputs (labor in his case). When diminishing returns are allowed, he
obtains values that are as high as φ = −2.
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growth rates across capital goods, and it is of interest to see how these translate
into diﬀerences in sectoral parameters. For these results, we use the benchmark
value of gq = 1.026 based on Cummins and Violante (2002). Jorgenson et al (2005)
report TFP growth measures for several capital goods industries. However, it is not
clear that their methodology of TFP measurement allows these figures to be mapped
directly into the current framework.13 Instead, we impute TFP growth rates using
Lemma 1, which implies a relationship between relative prices and relative TFP.
Cummins and Violante (2002) also provide data on the quality-adjusted relative
price of capital for a comprehensive list of durable good types, which can be used to
compute the long-run TFP growth rate for that good implied by Lemma 1.14
Results are reported in Table (2). Based on relative prices, TFP growth rates
across capital types range from 20% for computers and oﬃce equipment to 1.3% for
structures. Thus, the model economy is consistent with a wide dispersion of TFP
growth rates. A prediction of the model (and of many multi-sector models) is that
changes in the relative prices of goods should be related to the TFP growth rates
of the sectors that produce those goods, as measured by other methods. Hence,
Table (2) also reproduces the TFP growth rates from Jorgenson et al (2005), for the
period 1960 − 2004, and compares them to the TFP growth rates implied by the
model and the relative prices. It is to be expected that the values generated by the
model are higher: the price data used to compute model TFP are quality-adjusted,
whereas Jorgenson et al (2005) do not adjust for improvements in output quality.
Nonetheless, the correlations between the two series are high: 91% for the full series,
and 60% if one excludes Computers and Oﬃce Equipment, which is an outlier in
both cases. The Spearman rank correlation is a remarkable 62%.
Values of φi in Table 2 are below unity for all sectors. The data are consistent
with a wide distribution of values of φi across diﬀerent types of capital good when
compared to the value of φx for the "aggregate" capital sector in Table 1. Inter-
estingly, all capital goods industries appear to be more "fertile" than non-durables
when compared to φc in Table 1.15
13In particular, Jorgenson et al (2005) account for intermediate goods in their measurement
strategy, whereas the current model lacks intermediate goods.
14TFP estimates are based on relative prices of capital goods (adjusted for quality following
Gordon (1990)) and the benchmark value of γs. See Cummins and Violante (2002) for details on the
construction of the price indices. In Table 2, industries are aggregated to yield a consistent partition
between the classifications used by the two sources — using the BEA investment expenditure shares
for the price data, and Domar weights for the JHS data. We are grateful to Gianluca Violante for
providing us with relative price data.
15In a more disaggregated industry classification we find that only one category — Agricultural
Machinery excluding Tractors — is less fertile than the consumption sector.
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Capital good sector γMODELi φi γJHSi
Computers and oﬃce equipment 20.15 0.84 10.40
Communication equipment 9.66 0.69 1.24
Aircraft 8.82 0.66 0.74
Instruments and photocopiers 6.29 0.53 1.17
Autos and trucks 3.50 0.17 0.29
Fabricated metal products 3.32 0.13 0.56
Electrical transm. distrib. and industrial appl. 3.22 0.10 0.55
Other 2.98 0.03 0.51
Ships and boats 2.67 −0.08 0.45
Machinery 2.58 −0.12 0.19
Electrical equipment, n.e.c. 2.51 −0.15 0.83
Mining and oilfield machinery 1.89 −0.52 −0.16
Furniture and fixtures 1.66 −0.73 0.89
Structures 1.34 −1.14 −1.05
Table (2) — Total factor productivity growth γi in the model, based on the quality-
adjusted price of capital (Cummins and Violante (2002)). We also report TFP
values from Jorgenson et al (2005) (JHS). The Spearman rank correlation is 62%.
4.2 On R&D intensities
We now turn to the quantitative implications of the model for R&D intensity in the
2-sector case. According to (31), this requires calibrating three additional parame-
ters: δT , σx and σc. In the model, R&D is any activity that increases TFP. Thus,
the empirical counterpart of Li in the data includes not just research scientists but
everyone whose function is to complement and support their research activities rather
than the production of final goods and services, e.g. their laboratory assistants, ad-
ministrative staﬀ, sanitation and security service providers, etc. It could also include
the labor of people not occupied in research institutions if their activities add to
the accumulation of knowledge, such as certain management, marketing, and other
activities.16 Thus, the empirical counterpart of model R&D employment probably
involves "much more" than the numbers reported by the NSF. Still, although direct
16For example, in quality-adjusted terms, an activity that identifies that a certain scent or color
of soap is more valued by customers than another might be considered TFP-enhancing, caeteris
paribus.
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comparison may be diﬃcult, our results are suggestive as to the relative importance
of diﬀerent parameters.
δT = 0.0 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
R&D intensity, c 7.6 11.4 13.9 14.6 14.9 15.1
R&D intensity, x 32.7 35.9 42.3 45.5 48.1 49.2
σx = 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
R&D intensity, c 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
R&D intensity, x 32.7 32.5 32.3 32.2 32.0 31.9
σc = 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
R&D intensity, c 7.6 8.1 8.8 9.5 10.4 11.5
R&D intensity, x 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7
Table (3) — R&D intensity: Sensitivity to δT , σx and σc.
Results assume that all paremeters but the one of interest
are set to their benchmark values — however, this is
without loss of generality since R&D intensity in any given
sector does not depend on spillovers in other sectors.
We will study several diﬀerent values. Nonetheless, a benchmark is required.
Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimate depreciation rates for knowledge of 12%, and
Pakes and Schankerman (1984) find values up to 25%. However, these are all mea-
sures of the economic depreciation of ideas and, as with capital, this is distinct from
"physical" depreciation. Consequently, the value of δT in the model is likely to be
considerably smaller. Indeed, while the notion of "physical" depreciation is easy to
interpret for the case of capital, the same is not the case for knowledge. We use
δT = 0 as a benchmark. Estimates of cross-industry R&D spillovers that might be
useful for calibrating σi exist only for the manufacturing sector, and mostly for a
subset of industries that are responsible for the bulk of reported R&D. Nonetheless,
Schultz (2006) finds that statistically significant spillovers do not exist for most man-
ufacturing industries. Adams and Jaﬀe (1996) also argue that spillovers are unlikely
to be a significant source of returns to R&D. We select σx = 0 and σc = 0 as a
benchmark.
The sensitivity of R&D intensity to δT , σx and σc is displayed in Table (3). Raising
δT increases the increases the R&D intensity of both sectors as larger R&D invest-
ments are required for given rates of productivity growth. The spillover parameters
have far less impact on R&D intensity. Their impact is consistent with Proposition
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5: however, the primary determinant of R&D intensity appears to be φi, not σi.
Thus, in the model economy, TFP growth rates and R&D intensity may be highly
correlated in cross-section, because they are both primarily determined by φi and
not because there is any causal relationship between them. Indeed, Wilson (2002)
finds that R&D intensity is indeed related to the decline in the quality-adjusted price
of capital goods in industry cross-section — which in the current model is indicative
of relative TFP growth diﬀerences.
5 More on the Knowledge Production Function
5.1 Fertilization across sectors
A central result of the paper is that, in the model economy, long run diﬀerences
in TFP growth persist only to the extent to which industries diﬀer in terms of
knowledge fertility φi. The model economy, however, assumes that there are no
knowledge spillovers across sectors. Can diﬀerences in TFP growth rates persist
even when such "cross fertilization" is allowed for, and might other parameters have
a role to play when such spillovers are possible?
Suppose for simplicity that there are two sectors i and j in the model economy.
The production function for knowledge is:
Fiht = AiT
φij
jt
¡
T 1−σiiht T
σi
it
¢φi QαihtL1−αiht (32)
This is the same as (8), except that now it is possible for knowledge in sector i to
influence sector j, and vice-versa. φij is the extent to which sector i benefits from
knowledge produced in sector j. In this case, deriving the properties of a balanced
growth path yields the following results:
Proposition 6 Proposition 1 holds when Φ is replaced by
Φ1 =
∙
1− φx − φxc
µ
1− φx + φcx
1− φc + φxc
¶
− α
1− α
¸−1
(33)
Proposition 7 Along the balanced growth path, sectoral TFP growth rates satisfy
the condition
γ1−φc+φxcc = γ
1−φx+φcx
x (34)
Thus, if γc ≥ 1, then γx ≤ γc if and only if φx + φxc ≥ φc + φcx.
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It remains the case that diﬀerences in TFP growth rates are related only to
the fertility parameters. What matters is no longer simply the "self-fertilization"
parameter, but the sum of all the fertility parameters that benefit a given sector, re-
gardless of which industry generates the knowledge. When industry cross-pollination
is allowed for, the aggregate growth rate may depend upon fertility parameters other
than those in the durables sector, but only to the extent to which durable goods
benefit from knowledge produced in other industries. This is because there is an ex-
tra channel whereby the production of knowledge pertaining to durables may benefit
that sector, via feedback through knowledge production in non-durables.
5.2 Duplication in research
We next consider the possibility of duplication in research, i.e. the knowledge pro-
duction function may not be constant returns to rivalrous inputs:
Fiht = Ai
¡
T 1−σiiht T
σi
it
¢φi £QαihtL1−αiht ¤ψi (35)
where ψi is the returns to rivalrous inputs in sector i. This departs from the em-
pirical literature in that the stock of R&D spending no longer measures the stock of
knowledge.
Proposition 8 Proposition 1 holds when Φ is replaced by
Φ2 =
µ
1− φx
ψx
− α
1− α
¶−1
, (36)
where ψx ≡
Pz
j=m
ψjκj(1−φx)
1−φj
is a weighted average of ψj in the capital-producing
sectors.
Proposition 8 is identical to Proposition 1 if we replace (1− φx) by (1− φx) /ψx.
As in Proposition 1, the only restriction on fertility is on the capital goods sector.
The value of φx is still bounded away from unity due to the role of capital in the
knowledge production function, but this bound is less strict when there is duplication
in research in the "aggregate" capital sector (ψx < 1). Note that Jones (1995) also
allows for ψ < 1, in fact our relationship γx = g
Φ2
N is identical to that of Jones (1995)
if α→ 0. However, by assuming away capital in the knowledge production function,
Jones’ restriction is independent of ψ. Therefore allowing capital to be an input into
the production of ideas not only implies that Jones’ restriction is not suﬃcient (as we
discuss in Proposition 1), but it also implies that the degree of diminishing returns
also matters for the restrictions required by constant aggregate growth.
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Proposition 9 Along the balanced growth path, sectoral TFP growth rates satisfy
the condition
γ
1−φi
ψi
i = γ
1−φj
ψj
j (37)
Thus, for any two sectors i, j with γi, γj ≥ 1, we have
γi ≥ γj if and only if
ψi
1− φi
≥
ψj
1− φj
. (38)
Proposition 8 is identical to Proposition 1 if we replace 1−φiψi with 1 − φi. The
derminant of long run diﬀerences in TFP growth rates is still the fertility parameter,
now adjusted by the degree of returns to rivalrous inputs. Observe that, if ψi takes
similar values across sectors, the range of fertility values that are consistent with the
data does not depend on the value of ψi itself.
6 Concluding remarks
We develop a multi-sector endogenous growth model in which technical progress is
driven by the production of new knowledge. The model is specified so that the
production functions for goods and for knowledge are close to those estimated in
the empirical literature. In the model, we find that the only long-run determinant
of productivity growth diﬀerences across sectors is the parameter which dictates the
extent of decreasing returns to pre-existing knowledge in the production of new ideas
— the extent to which knowledge is fertile. Although this parameter has not been
identified as a potentially important source of cross-industry diﬀerences, it turns
out to play a pivotal role in general equilibrium, and a contribution of our paper
is to study the behavior of an economy in which this parameter may diﬀer across
industries. Moreover, the restriction on this parameter that determines the existence
of a balanced growth path applies only to the fertility of knowledge in the capital
goods sector, so that very large or very small intertemporal returns to knowledge "on
average" may be consistent with balanced growth.
Our growth model attempts to take into account a number of factors that growth
theorists and researchers of R&D have independently thought to be of potential
importance to productivity change and R&D intensity. Interestingly, we find that
inter-sectoral diﬀerences in productivity and R&D activity cannot be driven by most
of those factors. Whether or not improvements in the quality of measures of knowl-
edge eventually allow empirical work to confirm or reject this prediction, we suspect
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that any apparent tension between general equilibrium theories of growth and theo-
ries of R&Dmay lie in the nature of models of knowledge that underlie these theories.
The rigorous formulation and testing of diﬀerent theories of the way economically
useful knowledge is produced, stored and disseminated remains a fertile area for
future research.
Given the centrality of the fertility for knowledge, φi, one may ask what are its
determinants. Nelson andWinter (1977) argue that innovations often follow "natural
trajectories" that have a technological or scientific rationale rather than being driven
by movements in demand. Similarly, Rosenberg (1969) talks of innovation following
a "compulsive sequence." In a general equilibrium framework, demand plays an es-
sential role in providing incentives to innovate: however, in our model the primary
determinant of long run growth rates is the usefulness or relevance of past knowledge
for the generation of new ideas, something that is reminiscent of these "natural tra-
jectories" since it is leads to parametrically determined long-run TFP growth rates.
Mokyr (2002) suggests a nuanced view of knowledge, whereby there is a distinction
between the set of techniques that are known and the epistemic knowledge that un-
derlies them. Perhaps φi reflects diﬀerences in the structure of the feedback between
the techniques suggested by new epistemic knowledge and the epistemic knowledge
that is generated by the application or refinement of new techniques. Furman and
Stern (2006) identify the notion of "cumulativeness," which is related to the institu-
tions that allow scientists access to preexisting knowledge. Although it is unclear a
priori whether cumulativeness is related to φi, Ai, or both, this suggests that study-
ing the networks that underlie the storage and transition of knowledge may be useful,
and that there may be institutional dimensions to the value of φi. This raises po-
tentially interesting policy questions.17 In all, a theory of φi could be an interesting
extension of the paper.
17The Jones (1995) result that decreasing returns to knowledge were required for a BGP in the
presence of population growth was originally interpreted as ruling out the possibility of policy
impacting growth. However, if this is itself an institutional parameter, then policies that, for
example, enhance the density of the network of scientists may have a role to play in determining
long run growth rates.
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A Derivations
A.1 Household maximization
We first determine the optimal spending across diﬀerent goods taken as given the
total per capita spending on consumption sc and total spending on investment sx.
Omitting time subscript, the maximization problems across goods are
max
{cih}
c s.t. sc =
m−1X
i=1
Z 1
0
pihcihdh, and
max
{xjh}
x s.t. sx =
zX
j=m
Z
pjhxjhdh
where c and x are defined in the household problem. The optimal spending within
sectors i = 1, ..m− 1, across diﬀerent varieties h, isµ
cih
cih0
¶−1
μi
=
pih
pih0
=⇒ cih0 = cih
µ
pih
pih0
¶μi
(39)
which implies
ci =
µZ 1
0
c
μi−1
μi
ih0 dh
0
¶ μi
μi−1
= cih
"Z µ
pih
pih0
¶μi−1
dh0
# μi
μi−1
(40)
Using (40), define price index, pi ≡
U
pihcihdh
ci
=
hR
p1−μiih dh
i1/(1−μi)
. We can now
rewrite (40) as ci = cih
³
pih
pi
´μi
. Across good i, Cobb-Douglas utility yields picipjcj =
ωi
ωj
,
so pici = ωisc, together with utility function,
pc ≡
sc
c
=
m−1Q
i=1
pωii (41)
and the demand for good ih is
cih = sc
µ
pi
pih
¶μ ωi
pi
(42)
The result follows analogously for investment,
xjh = sx
µ
pj
pjh
¶μj µκj
pj
¶
and xj = sx
µ
κj
pj
¶
, (43)
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where pj is analogously defined as before, and
px ≡
sx
x
=
zQ
j=m
pκjj (44)
Given the solution of the static maximization, the dynamic problem is
max
{ct,xt}
∞P
t=0
(βgN)
t u (ct)
s.t.
pctct + pxtxt = wt +Rtkt + πt
gNkt+1 = xt + (1− δk) kt
The solution implies
u0 (ct)
βu0 (ct+1)
=
pxt+1/pct+1
pxt/pct
µ
1− δk +
Rt+1
pxt
¶
(45)
A.2 Firm’s maximzation
The firm’s maximization problem is
max
{Nit,Kit,Qit,Lit}
∞P
t=0
λt
Πiht
pct
s.t.
Tiht+1 = fiht + (1− δT )Tiht
Yiht = Ntciht if i = 1, ..m− 1
Yiht = Ntxjht if i = m, ...z
Given Πiht in (10), the static eﬃciency conditions are standard:
∂Yiht/∂Niht
∂Yiht/∂Kiht
=
wt
Rt
=
∂fiht/∂Liht
∂fiht/∂Qiht
The assumptions on production functions imply so, for any two sectors i, j, Kiht/Niht =
Qiht/Liht, and piht
³
1 +
Yjht
pjht
∂pjht
∂Yjht
´
Tiht = pjht
³
1 +
Yjht
pjht
∂pjht
∂Yjht
´
Tjht. Using the demand
function, relative prices is
piht
pjht
=
Tjht
¡
1− 1/μj
¢
Tiht (1− 1/μi)
(46)
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The dynamic eﬃciency condition involves the optimal R&D decision. The first order
condition of the Lagragian with respect to Tiht+1 is
λt+1
pct+1
∂Πiht+1
∂Tiht+1
− χiht + χiht+1
µ
∂fiht+1
∂Tiht+1
+ 1− δT
¶
= 0 (47)
where
χiht =
µ
λt
pct
¶
Rt
∂fiht/∂Qiht
(48)
is the shadow price for Tiht+1.
A.3 Market Equilibrium
The capital market clearing condition (11) and equal capital-labor ratios (49) imply
Kiht
Niht
=
Qiht
Liht
=
K
N
= k, and (49)
Rt = αpihtTihtkα−1t
µ
1− 1
μi
¶
; wt = (1− α) pihtTihtkαt
µ
1− 1
μi
¶
. (50)
together with χit in (48), dynamic equation (47) becomes
λtpiht/pct
λt+1piht+1/pct+1
Ã
Tiht¡
T 1−σiiht T
σi
it
¢φi
!
(51)
= Aikαt+1Niht+1 +
Tiht+1¡
T 1−σiiht+1T
σi
it+1
¢φi
µ
φi (1− σi)
Fiht+1
Tiht+1
+ 1− δT
¶
We now focus on the symmetric equilibrium across h within i.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. See the derivation of (49) and (46) in the Firm’s maximization.
Proof of Lemma 2. Define Tx such that:
Ntx ≡ Tx
µ
zP
i=m
Kit
¶αµ zP
i=m
Nit
¶1−α
= Txkα
zP
i=m
nit
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where the equality follow from (49). To determine Tx, (43) implies
pjTjkαnj
piTikαni
=
κj
κi
and,
by (46), niκi =
³
1−1/μi
1−1/μj
´
nj
κj
, so
zP
i=m
nit =
nj (1− 1/μx)
κj
¡
1− 1/μj
¢ (52)
where we define μx such that
1− 1
μx
=
zP
i=m
κi
µ
1− 1
μi
¶
⇔ 1
μx
=
zP
i=m
κi
μi
(53)
By definition, x =
zQ
j=m
³
xj
κj
´κj
=
zQ
j=m
³
Tjkαnj
κj
´κj
, so using (52) and (53), we obtain
x = kα
µ
zP
i=m
nit
¶
zQ
j=m
∙
Tj
µ
1− 1/μj
1− 1/μx
¶¸κj
so the index of knowledge is
Tx =
"
zQ
j=m
µ
1− 1/μj
1− 1/μx
¶#
zQ
j=m
T κjj . (54)
Proof of Lemma 3. The Euler condition follows from (45) in the Consumer’s
Maximization. Using (44) and (46),
px
pi
=
zQ
j=m
µ
pj
pi
¶κj
=
zQ
j=m
Ã
Ti (1− 1/μi)
Tj
¡
1− 1/μj
¢!κj
= Ti (1− 1/μi)
zQ
j=m
£
Tj
¡
1− 1/μj
¢¤−κj ∀i,
so by (54), we have
px
pi
=
Ti (1− 1/μi)
Tx (1− 1/μx)
∀i, (55)
together with (50), we have
R
px
=
αpiTikα−1
³
1− 1μi
´
px
= αkα−1Tx
µ
1− 1
μx
¶
,
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so the expression for G follows from its definition.
Proof of Lemma 4. Euler equation (45) implies
λt+1
λt
=
1
1 + rt+1
=
βu0 (ct+1)
u0 (ct)
=
pxt/pct
Gt+1pxt+1/pct+1
(56)
Using (55), pxt+1/pit+1pxt/pit =
γi
γx
, substitute into (51),result follows for (19).
Lemma 5 The equilibrium employment shares for production are
ni = ωi
c/q
Txkα
µ
1− 1/μi
1− 1/μx
¶
∀i < m, (57)
nj =
1− μj
1− μx
κj
Ã
zP
j=m
njt
!
∀j ≥ m. (58)
If positive, the R&D intensity of the firm satisfies
nit+1
lit+1
=
Gt+1γ
φi
it /γxt − (1− δT )
γit+1 − (1− δT )
− φi (1− σi) ∀i. (59)
Proof. Combine (19) with (7) to derive ni/li. To obtain ni, use market clearing
and the expenditure share of good i = 1, ..m − 1, piTikαni = pici = ωipcc, and so
ni = ωi
c/q
kα
³
px
Tipi
´
where q = px/pc. The result for ni follows from (55). The proof
for nj , j = m..z is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 1. Define ket = ktT
−1/(1−α)
xt . Let gx ≡ xt+1/xt for all
variables x. From the Euler condition (17), gc is constant if gq and G are constants.
From (18), G is constant if and only if ke is constant. Use Lemma 2 and (49) to
rewrite the capital accumulation equation as gNgk = kα−1et
zP
j=m
njt + 1− δk, it follows
that gk is constant if and only if
zP
j=m
njt is constant. So (58) implies nj are constants
for j = m, ..z. By defintion, ke is constant if and only if gk = γ
−1/(1−α)
x , which by (15)
is constant if and only if γj are constants for all j = m, ..z, which is true by (19) if
and only if
Ajkαt+1Njt+1T
φj−1
jt+1 = Ajk
α
et+1T
α/(1−α)
x njt+1Nt+1T
φi−1
jt+1
is constant. Given {nj}j=m,..z are constants, we must have ∀j ≥ m,
γα/(1−α)x gNγ
φi−1
j = 1 (60)
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which implies ∀i, j ≥ m,
γφi−1i = γ
φj−1
j , (61)
so γx =
zQ
j=m
γκjj =
zQ
j=m
³
γφi−1i
´κj/(φj−1)
, so ∀j ≥ m,
γ1−φxx = γ
1−φi
i , (62)
where φx satisfies (1− φx)−1 =
zP
j=m
κj
¡
1− φj
¢−1 . Thus, (60) implies
γ∗x = g
Φ
N , (63)
where Φ = (1− φx − α/ (1− α))−1 . Finally we need to show gq is constant, using
(41),
q−1 =
m−1Q
i=1
µ
px
pi
¶ωi
=
m−1Q
i=1
µ
Ti (1− 1/μi)
Tx (1− 1/μx)
¶ωi
, (64)
So gq is constant if and only if γi are constants. From (57), ni are constants for
i < m. Using (19) for i < m, γi is constant if and only if (60) holds for i < m as
well. Therefore, (61) holds for i < m as well. Use (49) to rewrite (7) as γit+1 =
AiT
φi−1
i Nt+1k
α
t lit + 1− δT . This is constant from (60). li is constant from (59).
Proof of Proposition 2. The transversality conditions are: lim
t→∞
ζtkt+1 = limt→∞χitTit+1 =
0, ∀i. χit and ζt are the corresponding shadow values. From the Firm’s maximization
and (55), we have
χit
χit−1
=
λtpxt/pct
λt−1pxt−1/pct−1
µ
γx
γi
¶
γ1−φii =
1
G
µ
γx
γi
¶
γ1−φii
where the last equality follows from (56). Using (17), 1/G = βg1−θc γ
−1/(1−α)
x , together
with (62),
lim
t→∞
χitTit+1 = χi0Ti0 limt→∞
£
βg1−θc γ
−α/(1−α)
x γ
1−φx
x
¤t
= χi0Ti0 limt→∞
¡
βgNg1−θc
¢t
where the last equality follows from (63). Using (64) and (61),
gq = γ(1−φx)/(1−φc)−1x (65)
where φc satisfies 1/ (1− φc) =
Pm−1
i ωi/ (1− φi) . So gc = gqγ
1/(1−α)
x = γΥx , where
Υ ≡ 1−φx
1−φc
+ α
1−α . TVC for Ti holds if β < min
¡
1/gN , β¯
¢
, where β¯ ≡ (1/gN)1+(1−θ)ΦΥ .
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The lagragian multiplier for k is the discounted marginal utility, ζt = (βgN)
t
³
pxt
pct
´
u0 (ct) ,
so lim
t→∞
ζtkt = limt→∞ (βgN)
t
³
qkt
ct
´
c1−θt . Since qk/c is constant, TVC for k holds if
and only if β < min
¡
1/gN , β¯
¢
. Finally, we derive conditions for positive li and
ni. From (7), li > 0 if and only if γi > 1 − δT , using (62) and (63), we have
gΦ/(1−φi)N > (1− δT )
1/(1−φx) . >From (19), ni > 0 if and only if
h
Gφii /γx − (1− δT )
i
−
φi (1− σi) [γi − (1− δT )] . Using (60) and (17)
Gγφi−1i
γx
=
Gγφx−1x
γx
=
γφx−1x
βg1−θc γ
−1/(1−α)
x γx
=
¡
βgNg1−θc
¢−1
(66)
where the last equality follows from (25). So Gφi−1i /γx > 1 given β < β¯. A suﬃcient
condition for ni > 0 is φi (1− σi) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (12) and (57),
y
c
=
pxTxkα
cpc
zP
i=1
1− 1/μx
1− 1/μi
ni =
qk
c
kα−1e
zP
i=1
1− 1/μx
1− 1/μi
ni =⇒
c
y
=
Pm−1
i=1 ni/ (1− 1/μi)Pz
i=1 ni/ (1− 1/μi)
which is constant given ni are constants. Using (50), the R&D expenditure share isPz
i=1 (Liw +QiR)Pz
i=1 piTiK
α
i N
1−α
i
=
(1− 1/μx) pxTxkα
Pz
i=1 Li
pxTxkα
Pz
i=1
1−1/μx
1−1/μi
Ni
=
Pz
i=1 liPz
i=1 ni/ (1− 1/μi)
.
Finally, the real interest rate is constant from (56).
Proof of Proposition 4. Condition (29) follows from (26), which implies γi/γj =
γ(
φi−φj)/(1−φi)
j . By (26) γi ≥ 1 if φi ≤ 1 ∀i. Together they imply: if γi, γj ≥ 1, then
γi ≥ γj if and only if φi ≥ φj.
Proof of Corollary 2. See derivation of (65) in proof for Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. From (31),
ni
li
− nj
lj
=
(
Gγφii /γx−(1−δT )
γi−(1−δT )
− Gγ
φj
j /γx−(1−δT )
γj−(1−δT )
+φj (1− σj)− φi (1− σi)
)
. (67)
By (60), the first part of the diﬀerence becomes
Gγφx−1x
³
γi
γx
´
− (1− δT )
γi − (1− δT )
−
Gγφx−1x
³
γj
γx
´
− (1− δT )
γj − (1− δT )
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=
Gγφx−1x
³
γj
γx
´
+ γi −Gγ
φx−1
x
³
γi
γx
´
− γx
[γi − (1− δT )]
£
γj − (1− δT )
¤ (1− δT )
=
³
Gγφx−1x /γx − 1
´ ¡
γj − γi
¢
[γi − (1− δT )]
£
γj − (1− δT )
¤ (1− δT )
From (66) we have Gγφx−1x /γx > 1, so the first part of (67) is positive if and only if
γj > γi. When γi, γj ≥ 1, condition (60) implies γj ≥ γi if and only if φj ≥ φi. The
second part of (67) is positve if and only if φj (1− σj) ≥ φi (1− σi).
Proof of Propositions 6 and 7. Since Tj is taken as given by firm ih, in terms
of the firm dynamic optimization, we just need to replace previous Ai with the term
T φijjt Ai, which now depends on t. Firm’s optimal condition (51) becomes
T 1−φiit λtpit/pct
λt+1pit+1/pct+1
= T φijjt Aik
α
t+1Nit+1 +
Ã
T φijjt
T φijjt+1
!
T 1−φiit+1
£
φi (1− σi)
¡
γit+1 − 1 + δT
¢
+ 1− δT
¤
As in Lemma 4 using (56) and (55), we have for sector x :
Gt+1γ
φx−1
xt = T
φxc
ct Axk
α
et+1nxt+1T
α/(1−α)+φx−1
xt+1 Nt+1 (68)
+γ−φxcct
£
φx (1− σx)
£
γxt+1 − (1− δT )
¤
+ 1− δT
¤
and for sector c :
Gt+1
γφcct
γxt
= T φcxxt Ack
α
et+1nct+1T
α/(1−α)
xt+1 T
φc−1
ct+1 Nt+1 (69)
+γ−φcxxt
£
φc (1− σc)
£
γct+1 − (1− δT )
¤
+ 1− δT
¤
Constant γx and γc requires the first term in both (68) and (69) to be constant, i.e.
γφxcc γ
α/(1−α)+φx−1
x gN = 1 and γ
φcx
x γα/(1−α)x γ
φc−1
c gN = 1. Combining the two equations
γφxcc γ
φx−1
x = γ
φcx
x γ
φc−1
c ⇔ γ1−φx+φcxx = γ1−φc+φxcc , (70)
which implies γx = g
Φ1
N , where Φ1 =
³
1− φx − φxc
³
1−φx+φcx
1−φc+φxc
´
− α
1−α
´−1
.
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Proof of Proposition 8 and 9. Lemma 1 − 3 hold as before. Firm’s optimal
condition (51) becomes
Gt+1
γit
γxt
Ã
Tit¡
T 1−σiit T
σi
it
¢φi
!
k(α−1)(1−ψi)t Q
1−ψi
it
= ψiAik
α
t+1Nit+1 +
Tit+1k
(α−1)(1−ψi)
t+1 Q
1−ψi
it+1¡
T 1−σiit+1 T
σi
it+1
¢φi
µ
φi (1− σi)
Fit+1
Tit+1
+ 1− δT
¶
Using Lemma 1, it simplifies to
Gt+1
γφiit
γxt
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
Aikαt+1Nit+1T
φi−1
it+1 ψik
(1−α)(1−ψi)
t Q
ψi−1
it +³
kt+1
kt
´α(ψ−1) ³ lit+1
lit
´1−ψ
g1−ψiN
£
φi (1− σi)
¡
γit+1 − 1 + δT
¢
+ 1− δT
¤
⎫
⎬
⎭
The restriction for BGP requires the first term to be constant,
Aikαt+1Nit+1T
φi−1
it+1 ψik
(1−α)(1−ψi)
t Q
ψi−1
it
= ψAikαet+1T
α/(1−α)
xt+1 nit+1Nt+1T
φi−1
it+1 k
α(ψi−1)
et T
α(ψi−1)/(1−α)
xt l
ψi−1
it N
ψi−1
t
which is constant if
γα/(1−α)x gNγ
φi−1
i γ
α(ψi−1)/(1−α)
x g
ψi−1
N = 1⇔
¡
γα/(1−α)x gN
¢ψi γφi−1i = 1 ∀i (71)
so across sectors we have
γφj−1j
γφi−1i
=
¡
γα/(1−α)x gN
¢ψi−ψj ∀i, j (72)
So γx =
zQ
j=m
γκjj =
zQ
j=m
∙³
γα/(1−α)x gN
´ψi−ψj
γφi−1i
¸κj/(φj−1)
, which implies γφx−1x =
γφi−1i
h
γα/(1−α)x gN
iψi−ψx
, for i ≥ m, where ψx =
Pz
j=m
κj(1−φx)
1−φj
ψj. Together with
(72)
γφj−1j = γ
φx−1
x
£
γα/(1−α)x gN
¤ψx−ψj ∀j (73)
But (71) implies
³
γα/(1−α)x gN
´ψj
= γ1−φjj , ∀j, substitute into (73),
γ
1−φj
ψj
j = γ
1−φx
ψx
x ∀j (74)
Substitute back to (71), we have
³
γα/(1−α)x gN
´ψi
γφx−1x
h
γα/(1−α)x gN
iψx−ψi
= 1, which
implies γx = g
Φ2
N , where Φ2 =
³
1−φx
ψx
− α
1−α
´−1
.
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